Petitioners' counsel reports that in a bench ruling
on September 10th the court issued a writ of mandamus directing the Governor
and Secretary of the Human Services Department to cease implementation
of a new welfare system through administrative regulations. The court ruled
that the defendants violated separation of powers provisions of the state
constitution because they made policy choices reserved to the legislature.
The court ordered the defendants to operate a welfare program consistent
with current state law.
The case arose after the Governor vetoed state legislation
adopted in response to the PRA of 1996 and proceeded to adopt a new welfare
system administratively, even though the new system conflicts with existing
state law. Petitioners are members of the state legislature and state residents
and taxpayers who receive public assistance. The State Attorney General
submitted an amicus on behalf of petitioners.
Petitioner's counsel reports that the defendants
have not yet complied and that they expect to seek further relief from
the court.
Petitioners' attorneys: Robert C. Ericson, New Mexico Center on Law
and Poverty, 121 Tijeras, NE, Suite 3001, Albuquerque, NM 87102, tel. (505)
243-6282, and others.
This case, previously reported in the December 1996 Welfare Bulletin, challenged on state Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and other grounds the state's submission to HHS of its TANF state plan, and the use of emergency rulemaking to eliminate the $50 child support pass-through as a violation of the state APA and due process. The appellate court has upheld the adverse decision of the lower court. The appellate court rejected claims that the TANF plan was a rule subject to the APA and held that emergency rulemaking was justified with respect to elimination of the pass-through and that such rulemaking did not violate due process.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Martha Kegel, Justice Alliance Legal Foundation and ACLU Foundation of Louisiana, P.O. Box 70496, New Orleans, LA 70012, tel. (504) 522-0744 and William P. Quigley, Loyola Law Clinic, New Orleans, tel. (504) 861-5590.
The court has preliminarily enjoined Pennsylvania's statute that during their first year in the state pays benefits to new residents based on the benefit available in their previous state. Unlike most courts that have decided this issue, the court in this case declined to apply strict scrutiny and instead found that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause under a rational basis analysis.
Plaintiffs attorneys: Richard Weishaupt and Jonathan Stein of Community
Legal Services, (215) 981-3700; Susan Frietsche and Elizabeth Shapiro of
the Women's Law Project, (215) 928-9801; Selena Fitanides of the ACLU,
(215)592-1513; and pro bono attorneys.
The court has issued a two page order denying plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction in this case challenging a defunct
four county AFDC demonstration project in which new residents were paid
the benefit available in their home states for their first six months in
Wisconsin. The court does not explain its reasoning in the order.
This case, filed as a class action, challenged notices sent to AFDC recipients as part of the transition from AFDC to its replacement program, F.I.P. Plaintiffs, whose benefits were reduced by up to $50 under a new policy reducing benefits for those in subsidized housing, challenged the adequacy of the notices. In a ruling from the bench the court found that there was a likelihood of success on plaintiffs' due process claims. The court identified two deficiencies in the notices - their failure to include individualized information about the effect of living arrangements on benefit amount and the failure to include information about appeal rights. It barred the defendant from reducing benefits pursuant to the new policy until it notifies recipients of the reason for the actions and the right to appeal. The state agency has reportedly cured the notice problem.
Plaintiffs' attorney: ACLU of Rhode Island (volunteer attorney Thomas
W. Lyons, III, tel. (401) 456-0700).
The magistrate held that the federal court had jurisdiction over claims that state officials violated due process rights of aid beneficiaries by placing them on vendor payments to landlords without a prior hearing and in a manner contrary to state law. Claims for retroactive payment were dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment. Requirements for class certification were found satisfied. A motion for a preliminary injunction to require a hearing with aid continuing is pending, with the defendant's response due on November 1.
Plaintiffs' attorney: Steve Norman, Vermont Legal Aid, P.O. Box 1367,
Burlington, VT 05402; tel. 802-863-5620; fax 802-863-7152.
The court in this case has issued a temporary restraining order restoring general assistance benefits to a nineteen year old high school student whose benefits had been discontinued because he refused a workfare assignment which would have required him to drop out of school.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Constance Carden of the New York Legal Assistance
Group and Chris Lamb of the Welfare Law Center.
This case arose from a dispute between a county welfare
department and a private, not-for-profit organization about which entity
was the employer for worker's compensation purposes of a workfare worker
placed by the welfare department with the not-for-profit. Because timesheets
were forwarded to the county, the county monitored the worksite and the
county could remove the workers from the worksite, the court held that
the county maintained overall control of the worker's work and was thus
the general employer of the workfare worker while the not-for-profit was
the special employer. The county was therefore held the employer for the
purpose worker's compensation. Interestingly, the court did not question
whether the workfare workers were employees.
This case challenges the New York State Labor Commissioner's refusal to permit workfare workers to have a representative of their choosing present at inspections resulting from health and safety complaints made by the workers. Petitioners make claims under the state and federal constitutions and state labor law.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: James Williams and Karen Yau of the National
Employment Law Project, 55 John Street, 7th floor, New York, NY 10038,
(212) 285-3025, ext. 109.
This class action lawsuit challenges a county eligibility
requirement that all GA applicants submit to a questionnaire which purportedly
identifies those likely to be chemically dependent (CD). Those identified
as CD by the questionnaire were required to participate in an ongoing treatment
program. Later the requirement was changed to require referral for a further
individualized assessment. Plaintiffs are individuals who were not CD when
they took the screening test but based on the results were treated as such
and required to cooperate with program requirements for chemically dependent
persons. They claimed that the screening test violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act, federal Due Process requirements, privacy guarantees
of the California Constitution, and state statutes. A study of the challenged
screening test concluded that it misclassifies 13% of the population as
CD who are not and 17% of the population as not CD, who are CD.
The court concluded that the test violates federal
regulations implementing the ADA, after rejecting a claim that the test
violates the ADA itself. With respect to the ADA, the court agreed that
the test imposes a disproportionate burden on those with past but not current
addiction and those mistakenly identified as CD, but found no evidence
that those referred for further screening or programs were denied GA. It
therefore concluded that plaintiffs were not denied meaningful access to
the program for ADA purposes. However, the court found that forced disclosure
of an individual's status as a recovering or recovered substance abuser
and related sensitive personal information in the subsequent assessment
process placed an additional burden on protected individuals which was
not necessary to the GA program. The court noted that the defendant had
not shown that the screening test was necessary to "identify the rather
modest percentage of CD applicants it in fact identifies, let alone that
the [test] is the best possible or even the best available method for screening
GA applicants for drug and alcohol abuse." Accordingly the court enjoined
the further use of the questionnaire to identify those for referral for
further assessment.