Saenz v. Roe, __ U.S. __ (1999).
In a resounding victory for low income people, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 on May 17, 1999 that California's policy of providing lower benefits to new state residents is unconstitutional because it infringes on the right to travel and results in unequal treatment of a state's citizens. The challenged policy provides that for the first 12 months of residence in California, welfare benefits for new state residents are limited to the amount provided by the state in which they previously resided. According to the majority opinion by Justice Stevens: "Citizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to choose to be citizens 'of the State wherein they reside.' U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, .1. The States, however, do not have any right to select their citizens." Justices Rehnquist and Thomas each filed dissenting opinions in which the other joined. According to the majority, there are three aspects of the right to travel: "the right of a citizen of one State to enter and leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than as an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State." The latter aspect of the right is at stake in this case and involves the right of new citizens in the state to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the state. This right is protected by the new arrival's status as a citizen of the state and her status as a United States citizen under Sec. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Because "the right to travel embraces the citizen's right to be treated equally in her new state of residence, the discriminatory classification is itself a penalty." Strict scrutiny is used to judge the validity of the state's policy, not the rational basis test urged by the state or the intermediate level of scrutiny suggested by the United States. A purpose of deterring migration does not justify the discriminatory treatment because 1) the empirical evidence suggests that so few move to a new state to receive higher benefits that there is no basis for burdening those without such a motive; 2) California denies that its purpose was to deter migration; and 3) such a purpose in any event is "unequivocally impermissible." Nor is the state's purpose of saving money acceptable justification. Neither the length of residence in the state nor the state of prior residence is relevant to individuals' current need for benefits or to the state's interest in fairly distributing funds. The 1996 federal welfare law's authorization of durational residency requirements does not save the state policy, since the Court has consistently ruled that Congress cannot authorize states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment and the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits federal as well as state powers. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, disagrees with the Court's use of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to invalidate what he calls a "good-faith residency requirement." While agreeing with much of the majority's analysis, he disagrees with the conclusion that the right to become a resident of a state is a component of the right to travel and finds that the durational residency requirement is a reasonable exercise of the state's power to assure that only its citizens receive its services. Justice Thomas, dissenting, also criticizes the majority's reliance on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, saying that the majority gives the Clause a meaning that was not intended when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and ratified. His review of the history of the amendment leads to his reading the Clause as protecting fundamental rights, not "every public benefit established by positive law." His opinion expresses the concern that the Clause will become "yet another convenient tool for inventing new rights..."
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Mark Rosenbaum et al., ACLU Foundation of Southern California, 1616 Beverly Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90026, tel. 213-977-9500; Evan H. Caminker; Lawrence H. Tribe; Martha Davis et al., NOW Legal Defense & Education Fund (NYC); ACLU and various chapters; Western Center on Law and Poverty.
Smith v. McIntire, No. 99-1044 (Mass. Superior Ct., Suffolk Cy., April 20, 1999).
The court has granted partial summary judgment in challenge to regulations that deny an earnings disregard in determining eligibility and an extension grant to families who have exhausted their 24-month time limit for Massachusetts Transitional Aid to Families with Dependent Children (TAFDC). Plaintiffs are working mothers who exhausted their time limits and who were 1) denied an extension of benefits because the earnings disregard was not applied or 2) have been or will be granted an extension but will be denied the earnings disregard in the extension grant calculation. They challenge the welfare department's regulations which provide for this result as a violation of the state welfare statute which requires the earnings disregard for the entire period of eligibility; the earnings disregard to be in effect while families are subject to a 2.75% cut; and the department to consider in determining eligibility for an extension whether a family has rejected a job without good cause, cooperated with work requirements, and whether job opportunities are available (Counts I and II). They also claim that the regulations violate the statutory requirement that TAFDC be administered in a "fair, just, and equitable" manner; Articles 1 and 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution; and the equal protection and due process guarantees of the federal Constitution. In granting partial summary judgment on Counts I and II, the court declined to defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute. It rejected the agency's position that an extension is a separate short-term benefit rather than a continuation of the 24-month period of benefits as inconsistent with the statutory language. It concluded that the statute does not authorize the agency to set up a separate category of aid and in effect fail to consider the mandated eligibility criteria for families who do not meet the financial eligibility test because an earnings disregard is denied. The court held that the earnings disregard must be provided for the 24-month period of aid as well as for any extension period. It rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the calculation of the amount of the extension grant, finding that since they have prevailed on the challenge to the financial eligibility test they have been injured by the regulation that would deny the disregard in the grant determination without consideration of the statutory criteria. The court said a preliminary injunction was not necessary since the defendant will be required to comply with the court's judgment. Its decision noted that a motion for class certification is pending. Plaintiffs' counsel notes that some 900 families are affected by the ruling, the state has sought a stay, and the plaintiffs have moved to enforce the court's order.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Deborah Harris (dharris@gbls.org) and Ruth Bourquin (rbourquin@gbls.org), Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, 90 Chauncey St., Suite 500, Boston, MA 02111-1722, tel. 617 357-0770, fax 617 357-0777.
Jiggetts v. Dowling (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1st Dept. May 6, 1999).
In a brief opinion, a New York appellate court has unanimously affirmed a lower court decision that New York City's AFDC housing allowance is illegal because it is not reasonably related to housing costs in New York City. The court concluded that the evidence supported the lower court's conclusion that the shelter allowance bears no reasonable relation to housing costs and that there is a direct correlation between inadequate shelter allowances and homelessness. Accordingly, the State Commissioner had failed to meet his duty under state law to provide for "adequate" shelter allowances. The lawsuit was brought in 1987 and led to a 1990 Court of Appeals decision, 74 N.Y. 2d 411 (1990), concluding that state law required that welfare families receive an adequate shelter allowance. In 1990 the lower court ordered the city to provide housing allowance supplements to families at risk of eviction, and under that system tens of thousands of families have received supplements. In 1997 the lower court ordered the state to develop a reasonable shelter allowance that is related to City housing costs.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Susan Bahn, The Legal Aid Society of New York, Brooklyn Office, 166 Montague Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201, tel. 718-422-2772, fax 718-722-3094; Scott Rosenberg, The Legal Aid Society, 90 Church Street, New York, NY 10007, tel. 212-577-3300, fax 212-577-7999.
N.B. v. Davis, Cause No. 49D11-9706-CP-926 (Superior Ct., Marion Cty., Indiana, Apr. 16, 1999).
This class action challenges the state's family cap policy as a violation of federal and state equal protection and due process and the federal constitutional right to privacy. Under the policy, the state denies a grant increase for a child born more than 10 months after the parent begins to receive assistance. The court has granted summary judgment for the defendants. In rejecting the equal protection claims, the court applied the lenient rational basis test and concluded that disparate treatment of individuals in the control and treatment groups and disparate treatment of those subject to the policy and families headed by a non-parent with whom children otherwise subject to the rule might be placed did not violate equal protection. The state's policy is rationally related to its purpose of encouraging mothers receiving assistance to "weigh alternatives, to make well-informed decisions, to strive for self-sufficiency and to promote equity among the working poor." The family cap policy does not burden the fundamental right to procreate because it does not deprive anyone of the right to procreate. The policy does not violate substantive due process because it does not interfere with a fundamental right and is not arbitrary and unreasonable. Plaintiffs are appealing.
Plaintiffs' attorney: Jacquelyn E. Bowie, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, 1031 East Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202-3952; tel. 317-635-4059; fax 317-635-4105; email: iclu@aol.com.
Juvier v. Steger, Case No. 3:96CV7564 (N.D. Ohio)
According to information from Ohio State Legal Services Association, a 1997 partial consent decree in this case provided that the county human services agency would provide translation services (including written materials, a telephone system, and interviews) to Spanish-speaking Food Stamp applicants and recipients. The consent decree was set to expire after 18 months. The plaintiffs have moved to extend the decree for seven months, because the defendants have not substantially complied. In their response to the defendant's opposition plaintiffs argue that the court has the power to extend the agreement, that the defendant has failed to comply substantially, that the defendant's obligation to provide Spanish services does not end with the decree, and that if their obligation ends with the expiration of the decree, plaintiffs will file a class action for injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs' attorney: Jesus R. Salas, Mark Heller, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, 740 Spitzer Bldg., 520 Madison Ave., Toledo, Ohio 43604; tel. 419-255-0814; fax 419-259-2880.
Cervantes v. Ekanger, No. ADV 98-00052 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Mont.; Jan. 25, 1999).
An appeal has been filed in the Supreme Court of Montana from a lower court decision upholding Montana's action in reducing current food stamp benefits to recover a 1990 over-issuance which was caused by agency error. The lower court held that application of the 1996 amendments to the federal Food Stamp law directing states to recover all food stamp overpayments, regardless of fault, was not improper retroactive application of a change in the law, the court ruled, since recipients had always been liable for all over-issuances even if collection action was not taken.
Plaintiffs' attorney: Russell A. LaVigne, Jr., People's Law Center, P.O. Box 526, Butte, MT 59703-0526; tel. 406-782-6118.
Complaint by New York Legal Assistance Group and others, submitted to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Civil Rights, Region II (submitted Mar. 29, 1999).
A complaint by the New York Legal Assistance Group (NYLAG), Make the Road By Walking, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, and New York Immigration Coalition, endorsed by other organizations, including the Welfare Law Center, charges that the New York City Human Resources Administration discriminates against limited-English speaking Medicaid and cash assistance applicants and recipients by failing to provide interpreters, caseworkers who speak the client's language, and related services to assure that limited-English speaking individuals have equal access to assistance.
Complainants' attorney: Randal Jeffrey, NYLAG, 130 E.59th St., New York, NY 10022-1392; tel. 212-750-0800.
In re K.W. (New York Department of Labor, Jan. 25. 1999).
The appellant was sanctioned after quitting his job. When he resumed work, therefore complying with work requirements, he asked for the sanction to be lifted. Yet the Chemung County Department of Social Services refused to lift appellant's sanction because it found his new job was not comparable with his old job. (He was working .36 fewer hours at the new job.) The fair hearing judge held that New York regulations require an individual to show a willingness to comply with a county's work program by signing the proper forms and reporting for a work assignment. The judge held that the county cannot additionally require the individual to find work "equivalent" to a previous job. Appellant's benefits were reinstated and the county was ordered to provide him with retroactive benefits.
In re L. (New York Department of Labor, Sept. 9, 1998).
Ms. L presented the Suffolk County Department of Social Services a form .completed by her doctor stating she was very limited in her ability to sit, lift, carry, push, pull or bend. She also gave the department a letter from the doctor saying she is unable to work. Without further evaluation, the Department of Labor declared the appellant eligible to work, classified her as work limited, and gave her a work assignment. She insisted she could not work and received notice she would be sanctioned for 90 days. At the state fair hearing, the sanction was reversed based on the medical evidence appellant had provided the Department.
In re M. (New York Department of Labor, Sept. 11, 1998).
Ms. M submitted a Department of Labor form filled out by her doctor which stated that she has a physical disability, thus has work limitations. Because her physician had not fully completed the form, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services closed her case without contacting the physician or providing Ms. M any notice. The administrative law judge reversed this decision, finding that the County could have given Ms. M an opportunity to amend the form, should have given her notice and, in any case, based on a "reasonable review" of the form, should have seen that her doctor found her employable with limitations.
In re B. (New York Department of Labor, Sept. 11, 1998).
Mr. B missed his work assignment because he could not find child care for his four-year-old. Although Mr. B explained his unsuccessful efforts to locate child care, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services sanctioned Mr. B. At the fair hearing, Mr. B testified that he called the child care providers the Department suggested, posted signs and looked in newspapers, yet did not find child care. The administrative law judge found that Mr. B's need to care for his son was good cause for his failure to attend his work assignment. The judge lifted the sanction and ordered the Department to reinstate Mr. B's benefits and pay retroactive benefits.
These decisions, part of GULP's Fair Hearings Bank, were provided by Susan Antos, Greater Upstate Law Project, 119 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 12210, tel.: 518-462-6831, fax: 518-462-6687, e-mail: santos@wnylc.com. Copies can be requested from: Nancy Krupski or Connie Lewis at 1-800-635-0355. To see GULP's Fair Hearings Bank visit the website of the Western New York Law Center: www.wnylc.com.