Bauer v. Rasmussen, No. S-99-714 (Nebraska Supreme Court, Jan. 4, 2001).
In a unanimous decision the court held that under the state’s welfare statute an Americorps U.S.A. stipend received by a welfare recipient attending college is not counted as income for purposes of determining the grant amount. The plaintiff, a grandmother caring for her grandchildren, was a college student who participated in the Americorps U.S.A. program, a federal program to give public service work experience to students in higher education programs. Her obligation under her welfare self-sufficiency contract was to fulfill her commitment to Americorps U.S.A. The welfare agency’s decision to count her stipend resulted in a reduction of benefits to the family and loss of medical coverage for herself. The court based its holding on language of the state welfare statute providing that financial assistance for "self-sufficiency related expenses" received from an illustrative list of sources is excluded from income. Although it found the statute ambiguous, the court noted that its construction was consistent with the welfare statute’s purpose of "removing disincentives to work and promoting economic self-sufficiency" and supporting further education to achieve self-sufficiency. The court was not persuaded by the agency’s position that the stipend be counted because it was based on a 1994 memorandum interpreting federal law and did not consider the subsequently enacted state statute. For more information visit www.neequaljustice.org.
Plaintiff’s attorneys: Sue Ellen Wall, Milo Mumgaard, Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law in the Public Interest, 941 O Street, Suite 105, Lincoln, NE 68508, tel. 402-438-8853; neapplaw@aol.com.
Doe v. McIntire, Civil Action No. 00-3014-F (Massachusetts Superior Court, Suffolk, Jan. 25, 2001).
This case, brought by legal immigrants who have been denied cash assistance under Massachusetts’ Supplemental Transitional Aid to Needy Families Program, challenges the requirement that the immigrant have resided in the state for at least six months prior to applying for benefits as a violation of federal and state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection. The state’s supplemental program is available to non-citizens who are ineligible for federally funded TANF benefits because they have not resided in the United States for five years. The court has granted partial summary judgment to the state and denied it to the plaintiffs. The court agreed that under Graham v. Richardson strict scrutiny applies to classifications based on alienage and that Mathews v. Diaz is not a basis for applying the rational basis test where, as in this case, federal law authorizes but does not require denial of state-funded benefits. However, the court applied the rational basis test in this case because it concluded that the state is not discriminating between citizens and non-citizens but against a sub-class of non-citizens - those who have not lived in the state for six months. The court found it significant that the state acted to create a program for non-citizens who were ineligible for federal TANF benefits. The court noted that in enacting the supplemental program the legislature acted to help non-citizens who were disqualified from receiving federally-funded TANF, that the state could have done nothing to provide benefits and that the state legislation did not further the interests of citizens over non-citizens. Because the state acted benignly, the court applied the rational basis test and upheld the six month residency requirement.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Deborah Harris, Iris Gomez, Massachusetts Law Reform
Institute, 99 Chauncey Street Ste 500, Boston, MA 02111, tel. 617-357-0700, e-mail: dharris@gbls.org; Sarah Levy, Greater Boston Legal Services, 197 Friend Street, Boston, MA 02114, tel. 617-371-1270; James Breslauer, Neighborhood Legal Services, 170 Common Street, Ste. 300, Lawrence, MA 01840, tel. 978-686-6900 , e-mail: bres@gbls.org.
Smith v. McIntire, Civil Action No. 99-01044C (Suffolk Superior Court, Mass.) (Corrected Memorandum of Decision and Order for Judgment, corrected Aug. 14, 2000).
In this case the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had previously held that state law requires that TANF families seeking an extension at the end of the time limit have the earned income disregard applied in determining eligibility for and the amount of the extension. 431 Mass. 638 (2000). Following this decision the plaintiffs challenged as contrary to state statute and federal and state constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process the defendant’s regulations which 1) provide that extension of benefits is a "separate, short-term benefit" and 2) require that recipients who obtain an extension must engage in 35 hrs. week of work and/or job search activities.
The state statute generally requires 20 hours per week of work activity. The defendant premised the imposition of the 35 hour a week requirement on its view that an extension is a separate, short-term benefit, distinct from the basic TANF benefit and that therefore she could impose additional eligibility criteria. The court rejected this interpretation based on the earlier decision of the Supreme Judicial Court specifically rejecting the view that an extension is a separate, short-term benefit. Accordingly, the court found that the defendant cannot impose more than a 20 hour a week requirement and that the 35 hour a week requirement violates state statute. The court also found that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the 35 hour requirement even though she was not yet subject to it because of a good cause determination.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys: Deborah Harris (dharris@gbls.org) and Ruth Bourquin (rbourquin@gbls.org), Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, 90 Chauncey St., Suite 500, Boston, MA 02111-1722, tel. 617 357-0770, fax 617 357-0777.
Yang v. O’Keefe, Civil No. 99-2033 (JMR/FLN (D.Minn. Dec. 12, 2000).
This case, brought by welfare applicants and recipients with limited-English proficiency (LEP) and organizations that serve immigrant communities, asserted that the state welfare agency’s failure to provide services in languages other than English to LEP individuals in the state’s economic assistance and health care programs violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and implementing regulations. According to the settlement, the state agency has agreed to take a number of steps, including the following: the state will require counties to provide free translation assistance; make critical health and welfare forms available in Spanish, Somali, Russian, Hmong, Laotian, Vietnamese, and Cambodian (and in Arabic in Spring 2001); make MinnesotaCare telephone information lines available in seven languages; work with plaintiffs to set up a method to determine into what additional languages forms will be translated (translation will occur when the potentially eligible population is 750); make various computer system modifications; instruct counties to develop a language access plan, and take other steps to inform the public about how to obtain translated forms (including making such forms more accessible on web). The Settlement agreement is available on the web at: www.mnlegalservices.org under the "What’s New" section.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys: Abigail Turner (aturner@midmnlegal.org), Kathleen M. Davis, Barbara J. Kuhn, Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance, 430 First Ave. North, Suite 300, Minneapolis, MN 55401-1780, tel. 612-332-1441; Melissa Weldon, Catholic Charities.
Dominika S. v. Saenz, Case No. 317039 (Superior Ct., San Francisco Cy., Cal.)(Stipulation and Order Re Permanent Injunction, Jan. 3, 2001).
Pursuant to the stipulation and order the defendants are barred from considering child support payments made on behalf of a minor parent intended to provide for the needs of the minor parent in determining the CalWORKS eligibility and grant amount for the minor parent’s child under the provisions of § 11254 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Among the settlement’s other terms are the following. It applies to current recipients and new applicants. The state will issue an All-County Letter informing counties of the change and consider, in consultation with plaintiffs’ counsel, whether regulations are needed. The issue of retroactive benefits remains under negotiation; the new policy will apply to the named plaintiff back to the date of her initial application. The court reserves jurisdiction to issue orders with respect to retroactive benefits, amendment of the complaint to allege a class action, and class certification.
Plaintiff’s attorneys: Jennifer Horne, Hope Nakamura, Peter Reid, Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County, 521 East 5th Ave., San Mateo, CA 94402, tel. 650-558-0915; Sarah E. Kurtz, Eve Stotland, National Center for Youth Law, 405 14th St., 15th Floor, Oakland, CA 94612, tel. 510 835-8098.
Fry v. Saenz (San Francisco Superior Ct., Cal.) (Feb. 9, 2001).
Under state statute public assistance is available to high school students until age 18 or until age 19 if the child attends school full-time and is expected to graduate by her 19th birthday. Many disabled students are denied benefits when they turn 18 because as a result of their disabilities they are not expected to graduate by their 19th birthday. This case challenges the denial of benefits to such students when they turn 18 as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The court has denied a writ of mandate. It did not issue an opinion.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys: Paula Gaber (ext. 29), Clare Pastore (ext. 25), Dick Rothschild (ext. 24), Western Center on Law and Poverty, Los Angeles, CA; tel. 213-487-7211; Ann Menasche, Legal Aid Society of San Diego, tel. 619-471-2630; Brian Lawlor, tel. 916-551-2150, Kan Tung, tel. 707-462-4117, Legal Services of Northern California.
Mason v. State of Nebraska, Case No. C100- (District Court, Lancaster Cy., Nebraska)(complaint).
Plaintiffs are minor dependent children who have been denied welfare benefits because of the state’s family cap rule. Their mothers are unable to work because of disability and receive SSI because of their disability. They claim that the state’s family cap statute which denies additional benefits for a child born to the recipient family after the initial ten months of "participation" is denied aid. Plaintiffs claim that the Nebraska welfare statute clearly provides that "participant" refers to those required who are able to work and to participate in the activities set out in self-sufficiency contract, and that the mothers of the plaintiff children are exempt from participation because of their disabilities. They claim that application of the family cap rule violates state law. The case was filed as a class action. For more information visit www.neequaljustice.org.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys: Milo Mumgaard, Sue Ellen Wall, Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law in the Public Interest, 942 O st., Suite 105, Lincoln, NE 68508, tel. 402 438-8853; Email: neapplaw@aol.com; Susan Koenig, 1266 South 13th St., Omaha, NE 68108.
Mankins v. Paxton, Case No. 99CVH01-202 (Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Ohio, Dec. 11, 2000)(Final Judgment).
The court has dismissed this action. As reported earlier, plaintiff's action grew out of a sanction imposed by the county welfare department for her failure to comply with work requirements imposed after an inadequate assessment. Following a work-related injury which prevented her continued employment, plaintiff applied for public assistance for herself and her daughter. She alleged that the welfare worker failed to conduct a proper assessment and develop a self-sufficiency plan that took account of her injury and that she was required to sign a boiler-plate facially-inadequate self-sufficiency contract. Despite her disability, the agency representative assigned plaintiff to a manual labor position. About the same time, her physician approved her limited return to her job, but the plaintiff re-injured herself, and the doctor significantly limited her activities. While the plaintiff was in the doctor's office, he telephoned the agency to report the disability and activity restrictions. The plaintiff, believing she had verified her inability to work, did not complete her workfare hours and thereafter received a sanction notice. The agency claimed she had not established good cause because she had not provided written medical verification.
A state fair hearing upheld the sanction based on the county's interpretation of its good cause standards and this was affirmed by the state Administrative Hearing Examiner. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged violation of federal due process, equal process and federal statutory rights, the Americans With Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. She also raised various state claims, including a claim that the administrative actions were arbitrary and against the weight of evidence, a claim that the delegation of legislative authority to the county violated various state constitutional provisions, and breach of contract claims. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages against the county.
The court has dismissed the action on the grounds that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. It concluded that plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that under the relevant statute her request for judicial relief should have been filed in another court. According to a report from Ohio State Legal Services Association, plaintiff has appealed and argues among other things that even if the court could have dismissed her claim for judicial review of the agency decision for lack of jurisdiction that dismissal would not affect other claims, that she did exhaust, that the state provides no administrative remedy for the state defendants’ action and that actions under 42 U.S.C 1983 do not require exhaustion.
Plaintiff’s attorney: Gary M. Smith, Equal Justice Foundation, 2010 North Walnut Street, Dover, OH 44622, tel./fax 330 364-4113.
Cottle v. Ohio Department of Human Services, Case No. 98 CV 2542 (Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, May 12, 1999).
The Court of Common Pleas reversed the decision of the Ohio Department of Human Services sanctioning the appellants because the determination by the state that the appellant’s situation was not in the county’s good cause plan was arbitrary, capricious, and irrational. The appellants, husband and wife, entered into new self-sufficiency contracts at their reapplication interviews, and were scheduled for interviews at different work sites. The wife attempted to attend her interview but the street address she had been given for the interview did not exist. She had no telephone number to contact the site, so she left a message with her caseworker and was later informed that the matter would be looked into. The caseworker did not reschedule the interview. The husband appeared for his interview but the interviewer thought he was appearing for work and gave him work assignments instead of interviewing him. The husband became upset and was asked to leave. The county department of humans services sanctioned the appellants for failure to appear for work activities.
The hearing officer and, upon administrative review, the administrative hearing examiner, upheld the county’s decision to sanction the appellants, reasoning that giving a participant an incorrect address, and encountering a personality conflict between a participant and a caseworker, were situations that were not listed in the county’s good cause criteria and therefore were not recognized excuses for failing to appear.
The Court of Common Pleas held that the state’s position made "no sense" and was arbitrary and capricious. The court reasoned that the appellants’ failure to appear was evidently the county’s fault and not the appellants’ and, therefore, the state’s strict interpretation of "good cause for noncompliance" was unlawful and unreasonable, and in this case, should be reversed.
Appellants’ representative: Patrick Duricy, Northeast Ohio Legal Services-Warren.
In re T.F. (Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, October 20, 2000).
The administrative hearing examiner held that the appellant would suffer a hardship due to the termination of Ohio Works First because of the 36-month time limit, and therefore, even though the appellant’s situation did not fit within the criteria established by the county’s hardship plan, the appellant was entitled to an extension. The appellant and her two children received OWF for 36 months and therefore their benefits were proposed for termination. The appellant appealed the termination, but was denied because her situation did not fall within the county’s hardship plan criteria for an extension.
The appellant had been exempted from work activities for the first 22 months of her receipt of OWF because she cared for her disabled spouse (who received SSI) and her children. For the remaining months, she was assigned to counseling. The appellant asserted that the first 22 of the 36 months should be disregarded because the appellant was not assigned to a work activity that would enable her to become self-sufficient once here benefits were terminated. She also asserted that she and her children would suffer a hardship as a result of the loss of OWF benefits. Although the appellant’s situation did not fall within the county’s hardship criteria, the administrative hearing examiner held that because the county did not provide evidence that it has exceeded its 20% limitation on hardship extensions [R.C. § 5107.18(E)], and because "the evidence demonstrates that the removal of the OWF monthly benefit will be a hardship for the Appellant" an extension should be granted. The administrative hearing examiner reasoned: "Appellant continues to be needed to care for Spouse in the same manner that permitted Agency to exempt Appellant from work activity and to participate in alternative work activity during the three years of benefits. Appellant is unable to work to replace the OWF monthly benefit and was unable to obtain self-sufficiency through the work activities under the OWF program."
Appellant’s representative: Trina Adkins, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services - Portsmouth.
The two items above were reprinted from OSLSA Reports, Vol. 22, No. 9, December 2000.