This case was last reported in the October 1996 Welfare Bulletin. The United States Supreme Court has denied review in this General Assistance case involving a narrowing of the eligibility standards and the denial of a pretermination hearing to those found ineligible for continuing assistance due to failure to meet the new standard. The lower court held that plaintiffs did not have a property interest in ongoing assistance beyond their current certification period and therefore due process did not require pretermination hearings. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision is reported at 669 A.2d 115. CH #47,460.
Plaintiffs' attorney: Lynn E. Cunningham, George Washington University Law Clinic, 2000 G St., NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20052; tel. 202-994-7659.
In a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeals has held that families seeking emergency shelter do not have a property interest for due process purposes. Although District of Columbia law provides objective eligibility criteria for homeless families seeking shelter, homeless families do not have an expectation of shelter sufficient to create a property interest for due process purposes. The D.C. statute provides that there is "no entitlement" to shelter and the court said that this language does not itself preclude a finding of a property interest. Nonetheless, the court concluded that there is no constitutionally protected property interest because the city does not provide shelter for all eligible families and gives "unfettered discretion" to administrators to determine which eligible families get shelter, and no law prevents officials from distributing shelter in a way that leaves some eligible families unserved. The court reversed the decision of the lower court which had found a property interest and required the District to modify verification requirements and hearing procedures to comply with due process. The court also concluded that a policy restricting homeless advocates' access to the shelter office waiting room to certain hours violates the First Amendment. Judge Wald dissented on the question of whether there is a property interest. She concluded that families that meet the eligibility criteria have a future interest in shelter similar to future interests long recognized in property law, and that having adopted a wait list allocation system the city does not have unfettered discretion to deny shelter to a family who has moved to the top of the list. According to Judge Wald the wait list system, while in effect, creates a reasonable expectation of entitlement to shelter sufficient to trigger due process. This case was last reported in the November 1996 Welfare Bulletin. The lower court decision is reported at 918 F. Supp. 440 (D.D.C. 1996). CH #48,908.
Plaintiffs' attorney: Katherine McManus, Howrey & Simon, 1299 Pennsylvania
Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20004; tel. 202-783-0800.
New York Court of Appeals has held that foster parents have a right to a fair hearing from the state to challenge the denial or failure to act on a request for foster care maintenance payments at a particular rate when the child cared for no longer resides with the foster parent. The court relied on plain language of both the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and the applicable state statute to determine that nothing in either limited when the foster parent could request the hearing. CH # pending.
Plaintiffs' attorney: Ian Feldman, Legal Aid Society/Bronx Neighborhood
Office, 953 Southern Boulevard, Bronx, NY 10459; tel. 718-991-4600; fax
718-842-2867.
This class action challenge brought by former AFDC recipients against New York and New York City welfare and child support enforcement agency officials, included claims based on the Social Security Act and federal regulations, state law, and federal due process that defendants failed to distribute in a correct and timely way child support collected after the family ceases to receive AFDC; failed to properly notify class members; and denied plaintiffs' rights to a hearing to challenge the alleged failure to distribute child support. According to the stipulation and order of discontinuance, a class is certified and defendants agree to take various steps including steps to reclassify AFDC cases that are terminated to non-AFDC status (so that child support can be distributed to the client) within 6 days of being identified as an appropriate case for reclassification; provide semi-annual reports to plaintiffs' counsel; review its procedures and make necessary revisions; provide required notice under 45 CFR 302.22(a)(4) to former AFDC recipients; provide clients a desk review of collections made on their behalf; publish for public comment a regulatory amendment concerning desk reviews which incorporates specific elements; and post notices in welfare offices of the right to request a desk review and publish such notices in newspapers. The court will retain jurisdiction over the matter for 18 months. CH #48,779.
Plaintiffs' attorney: Martha Davis, NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund, 99 Hudson St., New York, NY 10013; tel. 212-925-6635.
Plaintiff, a high school student whose Home Relief (general assistance) case was terminated for failure to comply with a workfare assignment which would have forced him to quit school, challenged that termination. He asserted claims under the state constitutional provision that guarantees him a public education, the state education law, and the state social services law, which provides that in most cases nineteen-year-olds should be assigned to education as their mandatory activities under the state's JOBS program (which applies to HR recipients as well as to AFDC recipients) and that, in any case, people should not be assigned to activities that interfere with their education. The court has upheld the termination, finding the case moot as a matter of law, since plaintiff is currently ineligible for aid and state law prohibits correction of underpayments to people not currently eligible. The court also concluded that the workfare requirement took precedence over JOBS education provisions and that the defendant did not have to accommodate plaintiff's school schedule. It declined to follow the decision in Hestag v. Hammons, Index No. 403426/96 (N.Y. Sup.Ct., N.Y. Cy., November 14, 1996) which held that imposition of a workfare sanction was contrary to New York statute and regulations which mandate that work assignments not "interfere" with participants' educational programs. It said that the state constitutional and education law claims were not properly before the court because they were not raised in the administrative hearing and that they were without merit. Plaintiff has filed a notice of appeal. CH # pending.
Plaintiff's attorneys: Christopher Lamb of the Welfare Law Center, tel.
212-633-6967, and Davis Polk & Wardwell.
On appeal from an administrative decision, the Court finds that the New York City Department of Social Services had failed to properly respond to petitioner's claim that she was medically unfit to work and inappropriately assigned her to workfare. The Court observed that the City Department was required by law to obtain a medical examination once petitioner indicated she was unemployable. The Court further criticized the failure of the ALJ to develop the record by fully questioning the appellant, to assist the appellant to present evidence and question witnesses, and to independently order a medical assessment of appellant's condition. CH # pending.
Petitioner's attorney: Ian Feldman, Legal Aid Society/Bronx Neighborhood
Office, 953 Southern Boulevard, Bronx, NY 10459; tel. 718-991-4600; fax
718-842-2867.
This case challenged a six- month disqualification for AFDC benefits based on plaintiff's receipt of a lump sum on the grounds that agency worker misinformation provided to and relied on by the plaintiff was grounds for application of equitable estoppel. The court noted that while plaintiff may have established the traditional elements of equitable estoppel, Massachusetts courts are reluc tant to apply this principle to the government. Accordingly, the court refused to apply the principle in this case, although it found that the agency's action was "particularly unjust and completely avoidable." CH # pending.
Plaintiff's attorney: Deborah G. Roher, Southeastern Mass. Legal Assistance Corp., 30 Third St., Fall River, MA 02720; tel. 508- 676-6265; fax 508-676-5861.