Gates v. McIntire, No. 99-0642-H (Suffolk, MA Superior Ct., , Mar. 11 and Mar. 25, 1999) (Order Denying Preliminary Relief and Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration) and 999-J-218 (MA Appeals Court, May 3, 1999) (Memorandum and Order).
This case challenges the state's family cap policy on the grounds that it unfairly penalizes children for the reproductive conduct of their parents in violation of federal and state equal protection and due process; that it seeks to influence private, procreative conduct in violation of federal and state due process; and that it penalizes those who have rejected abortion for religious reasons in violation of federal and state constitutional rights to religious freedom. On March 11th the court denied plaintiffs' request for preliminary relief, finding that although they had demonstrated irreparable harm, they had failed to show a real chance of prevailing on the merits. The court applied the rational basis test, relying on Dandridge v. Williams, and concluded that there was a "rational, if not necessarily humane, basis for the law." The court also observed that it had to apply the law "as uncomfortable as it makes this particular Court to have its government utilize the weakest, most vulnerable and innocent among us -- the babies of welfare mothers -- as fodder for the cannons of social reform, particularly when the government is awash in revenue surplus...." On March 25, the court denied plaintiffs' request for reconsideration. On May 3, 199, a single justice of the Appeals Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that strict scrutiny, rather than the rational basis test, should apply, and denied their request for preliminary relief.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Deborah Harris, Ruth Bourquin, Alan Rodgers, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, 99 Chauncy Street, Suite 500, Boston, MA; tel. 617-357-0700; fax 617-357-0777; email dharris@gbls.org and rbourquin@gbls.org.
Martinez v. Turner, et. al., Index No. 401716198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty., May 5, 1999) Amankwah v. Turner, et. al., Index No. 401732198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty., May 5 1999)
In these two cases, welfare recipients who had sought fair hearings to challenge proposed sanctions sought judicial review of the fair hearing decisions upholding their sanctions. The court vacated the administrative decisions and remanded for action consistent with its decision. Overall, the court found that the treatment of these recipients fell into a discernable pattern of bias toward welfare recipients during the sanctioning and administrative hearing process. It concluded that the City and State disregarded "its rules, regulations, consent decrees, and due process essentials in sanctioning both petitioners for their alleged failures to comply with employment requirements." The court's opinion includes a detailed recitation of the facts of each case and quotations from the minutes of the fair hearings. One of the petitioners, Mr. Martinez, had sought a hearing to challenge a proposed sanction and to seek an employment exemption based on his need to care for his disabled wife. The Court found that by refusing petitioner's documentation of his exemption claim because it was one day late, by failing to bring the full file to the hearing and failing to withdraw the proposed sanction because of that failure, the City violated an earlier consent decree in Rodriguez v. Blum. The court also found that the city representative and the hearing officer did not fully understand the case and misled the petitioner into withdrawing his exemption claim. The City also violated a court ordered stipulation in Robinson v. Grinker by denying benefits despite his genuine inability to provide specific documentation of the illness that led to his alleged failure to comply. The City's numerous failures during the decisionmaking process violated the law and its conduct at the hearing which misled the hearing officer and prevented petitioner from being heard on a significant issue denied him a fair hearing. With respect to the state the court found that the hearing officer denied petitioner's right to a fair hearing because she did not understand and apply the law, did not properly develop the record, refused relevant documents offered by petitioner, and forced him to withdraw an arguably valid claim. The hearing officer also violated state law and policy by shifting to the petitioner the burden of proof on the issue of failure to cooperate willfully without good cause, by rejecting the credibility of petitioner's testimony without an explanation of why the testimony was rejected, and by failing to accept valid excuses given by petitioner. The case of the second petitioner, who was sanctioned for missing a day at the work site because he had lost the address of the site and who had unsuccessfully sought to make up the lost day, involved similar failures by the city and the state. The Court concluded with the following observation: "...petitioners were pro se, poor, vulnerable individuals. They clearly were not familiar with their rights, nor of course to the specific Decrees, Agreements, and Rules respondents had entered into. They were allowed to slip, perhaps even pushed, through the safety net by official employees, whose job it was, not to do that. Due Process is not so much about the results, but rather about the process or the mechanism by which results are reached. It is all about fairness and it includes not only the actuality of it, but the perception of it, as well. Neither petitioner here was treated fairly, culminating in their suspension of benefits for ninety days. Neither was ever given an opportunity to be fully informed of the charges, to be informed of their rights, as well as their responsibilities, to be assisted in maintaining their benefits, and finally to obtain a fair, unbiased hearing."
Plaintiffs' attorney: Susan Sternberg, The Legal Aid Society, 166 Montague St., Brooklyn, NY 11202, tel. 718-722-3100, fax 718-722-3093.
Juvier v. Steger, Case No. 3:96 CV7564 (N.D. Ohio, May 1999).
As reported in the May 1999 Welfare Bulletin plaintiffs sought extension of a 1997 partial consent decree requiring the county human services agency to provide translation services (written materials, a telephone system, and interviews) to Spanish-speaking Food Stamp applicants and recipients. The court has extended the partial consent decree, which was set to expire January 30, 1999, until November of 1999 with respect to the telephone line service but denied extension as to the other aspects. It was not until seven months after the decree was in effect that the Defendants complied by putting the telephone system in place. As to the other aspects of the consent decree providing translation services for Spanish-Speaking individuals and access to expedited Food Stamp Benefits, the court found that there was substantial compliance and that technical errors were not tantamount to a violation.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Jesus R. Salas, Mark Heller, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, 740 Spitzer Bldg., 520 Madison Ave., Toledo, Ohio 43604; tel. 419-255-0814; fax 419-259-2880.
Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999).
The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed the lower court decision upholding the 1996 federal welfare law's exclusion of certain non-citizens from Supplemental Security Income, Food Stamps or both. Plaintiffs represent a class of elderly, disabled and poor individuals, all of whom were living in Florida at the time the law was enacted and who do not fall into any of the fourteen categories of non-citizens who remain eligible. Plaintiffs claimed that the provision resulting in their exclusion violates their Fifth Amendment right to equal protection. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the district court should have used a heightened scrutiny instead of the rational basis test, and that even if the rational basis test was applicable, the district court erred in concluding that the provision satisfied the test. The Eleventh Circuit, agreeing with the lower court, found that Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) required a rational basis test and found that Congress' decision to limit the number of non-citizens who are eligible for certain federal programs to the fourteen limited categories challenged here was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of reducing the cost of those welfare programs. In addition, none of the fourteen categories were found to be irrational.
Plaintiffs' attorney: JoNel Newman, Florida Justice Institute, 2870 First Union Financial Center, 200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, FL 33131-2309; tel. 305-358-2081; fax 305-358-0910.
Meachem v. Wing, Civ. Action No. 4630 AGS (S.D.N.Y.,filed June 1999) (Complaint).
This class action, filed on behalf of recipients of cash assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid, asserts claims of procedural due process violations in New York State's fair hearing system. Each of the plaintiffs and class members requested the hearing to challenge a case closing or reduction in aid for failing to respond to an appointment notice or eligibility questionnaire. In each instance the appellant contended that the mailing at issue was not received. However, the State routinely refuses to credit plaintiffs' or plaintiff class members' testimony of non-receipt of the mailing and treats as conclusive affidavits of mailing submitted by the local agency. Plaintiffs complain that the State consistently ignores the fact that the affidavits are out-of-date and internally inconsistent and that the State illegally treats the affidavits as creating an irrefutable presumption of receipt of the mailing at issue. In addition, plaintiffs complain that they are routinely denied the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to review documents used as evidence against them, and to submit their own witnesses and documentary evidence. Indeed, many of the hearings last no longer than three to four minutes. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to enjoin the State from conducting any more fair hearings on the issue of non-receipt of a mailing until the State brings the hearing process into conformity with federal regulations and due process mandates. Plaintiffs ultimately seek an order requiring defendants to comply with applicable due process mandates and to reopen and grant new hearings for adverse hearing decisions rendered within the last three years.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Marc Cohan and Rebecca Scharf of the Welfare Law Center; Scott R. Rosenberg and Richard E. Blum of The Legal Aid Society, Civil Appeals & Law Reform Unit, 90 Church Street, New York, NY 10007, tel. 212-577-3648; Ian F. Feldman, Steven Godeski, and Esperanza Colon of The Legal Aid Society, Bronx Neighborhood Office, 953 Southern Boulevard, Bronx, NY 10459, tel. 718-991-4745; Susan R. Sternberg of The Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn Neighborhood Office, 166 Montague Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201, tel. 718-422-2762; Patrick J. Horvath of the Urban Justice Center, 66 Broadway, New York 10012, tel. 212-533-0540; Matthew Schneider of the New York Legal Assistance Group, 130 East 59th Street, New York, NY 10022, tel. 212-750-0800.
Bradshaw v. State of New Jersey, Department of Human Services, Docket No. A-006277-97T1 (Superior Ct., NJ., June 28, 1999) (Appellant's Brief).
An appeal has been filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey from a final agency decision denying TANF cash assistance to appellant because, although she and the dependent child in her legal custody are blood-related second cousins, the particular blood relationship did not fall within the regulatory definition of "parent-person." The County Welfare Agency had terminated TANF assistance on the ground that the blood relationship between the adult and the dependent child in the TANF "assistance unit" was of the sixth degree and not of at least the fifth degree. The Initial Decision after a fair hearing recommended reinstatement on the ground that the appellant and child were blood relatives and that the regulation violated the New Jersey Work First statute. The Final Decision rejected this decision and upheld the termination. Lawyers for the appellant argue that nothing in the Work First New Jersey (WFNJ) statute permits the state to narrow the definition of blood- related to exclude second cousins or other relatives of the sixth degree from the definition of assistance unit. The state regulation is therefore invalid because it excludes many needy persons eligible for TANF, such as the appellant and her legal dependent, who document a blood relationship between them but fall within the sixth or more remote degrees. They also argue that the court order granting custody established the requisite legal relationship as required by the statute and that the regulation which recognizes as legal relationships only those created through marriage, adoption or legal guardianship is impermissibly narrow.
Plaintiff's attorneys: C. Regan Almonor, Leighton Holness, Maura Sanders, Legal Services of New Jersey, P.O. Box 1357, Edison, NJ 08818-1357; tel. 732-572-9100; fax 732-572-0066
In re T.S. (Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, May 13, 1999).
The appellant was sanctioned after missing two appointments at the Employment Security Department due to her many commitments, including cooperation with pending legal matters, appointments related to her mental health needs, her children's health and special needs, and her own job search. The Department of Social and Health Services refused to respond to her requests for the opportunity to submit an explanation as to why she missed her appointments and her request to reschedule. In a detailed decision, an Administrative Law Judge reversed the WorkFirst sanction and resulting termination of child care assistance involving the appellant, who was also a victim of domestic assault and who had mental health problems. The ALJ ruled that the DSHS sanction and actions were invalid because they failed to make the Needs Supplemental Accommodation required with respect to those with mental, physical or other impairments or limits that affect access to agency programs. In addition, although the client had provided information to the agency about the domestic violence and her own and her children's medical and other special needs, the agency failed to consider the client's personal and family circumstances in creating the client's Individual Responsibility Plan and did not perform the domestic violence screening or inform the client about the Family Violence amendments and available waivers or follow procedures related to the Family Violence amendment. The DSHS did not appeal this decision and agreed to pay the client for various documented child care expenses incurred during the sanction period and for transportation reimbursement for countable work activities.
Plaintiff's attorney: Stephen Gockley, Northwest Justice Project, Bellingham, WA. Decision provided by Columbia Legal Services, 101 Yesler Way, Suite 600, Seattle, WA 98104; tel. 206-464-1122.
In re X (Washington State Office of Adm. Hearings for Dept. of Social and Health Services, 1999).
A Washington Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) has found that a caseworker's interpretation of "direct employer contact" was invalid and reversed a sanction. The appellant had signed an individual responsibility plan .which stated that she would make a minimum of 15 direct employer contacts per week and spend no less than 30 hours per week searching for a job. Appellant complied by researching employers and compiling and sending out 17 resume packets to those employers. The Employment Security Department (ESD) sanctioned appellant for not making "direct employer contacts." The ESD caseworker defined "direct employer contacts" as face to face contact with employers and determined that appellant's resume packets did not qualify. The ALJ concluded that ESD personnel could not impose their individual interpretation of "direct employer contact" on the appellant. If ESD decides to narrow the definition of "direct employer contact" it must do so in a written agreement or in a written policy. The ALJ further concluded that any interpretation of the requirement to look for and accept any job offered must be "reasonable." The ALJ determined that the appellant, by sending out 17 resumes, had demonstrated that she had been looking .for jobs for which she was qualified and that she had made the required number of contacts. He subsequently reversed the sanction that ESD had imposed. In addition, Conclusion of Law 7 states that ESD or its contractor should be providing "appropriate assistance" to allow a client to overcome any barriers to employment.
Plaintiffs' attorney: Lisa Brodoff, Clinical Law Program, School of Law, Seattle University. Decision provided by Columbia Legal Services, 101 Yesler Way, Suite 600, Seattle, WA 98104; tel. 206-464-1122.