Anderson v. Roe, No. ____, (U.S. Sup. Ct., October Term 1998).
The State of California filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court in July 1998 asking that the Court review the decision below holding California's durational residency requirement for cash assistance unconstitutional. Under the California policy, which has been enjoined, the state would pay persons who had resided in California less than a year welfare benefits at the whatever level is lower: the level they would have received in the state from which they had moved, or the California level. The decision below, Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998), relied upon Shapiro v. Thompson and other Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court's decision granting or denying review is expected in October.
Respondants' attorneys: Mark Rosenbaum et al., ACLU Foundation of Southern California,
1616 Beverly Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90026, tel. 213-977-9500; Martha Davis et al., NOW
Legal Defense & Education Fund (NYC); ACLU Foundation of San Diego and Imperial
Counties; ACLU Foundation of Northern California.
Sanchez v. Dept. of Human Services, No. A- 466-97T1F (N. J. Super. Ct., App. Div., July 8, 1998).
Under New Jersey law, needy eligible persons who have resided in the state less than 12 months receive a benefit at the level of benefits in their former state if that level is lower than the New Jersey benefit level. (The court noted that there are some 17 states whose benefits are higher than New Jersey's.) The court held that this provision infringes upon the fundamental constitutional right to travel and migrate, and violates the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions under either the compelling interest or rational relationship test.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Melville D. Miller, Harris David, Leighton Holness, Regan Almonor, and Mary Acevedo, Legal Services of New Jersey, P.O. Box 1357, Edison, NJ 08818-1357, tel. 908-572-9100.
Hicks v. Peters, No. 98C3247 (N.D.Ill., July 16, 1998).
The District Court granted a permanent injunction against the enforcement of Illinois law under which eligible applicants who have resided in Illinois for less than 12 months and who received public assistance in their former state of residence in any of the 12 months before moving to Illinois, are to be paid benefits set at the lower of (1) the amount that they would have received in their prior state, or (2) the Illinois level. The court found that there was no rational relationship between the classification of new residents and a permissible state purpose. The court declined to decide whether the provision penalized the exercise of the right to travel and must therefore be justified by a compelling state interest. The court went on to note that if forced to do so it would have found no penalty because it had not been proven that the primary purpose was to deter travel, that travel was deterred, or that travel was penalized. On this last point it relied upon Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311 (E.D.Pa. 1997).
Plaintiffs' attorneys: John M. Bouman, Wendy Pollack, Dory Rand, Carolyn Shapiro, and
Margaret Stapleton of the Poverty Law Project, National Clearinghouse for Legal Services,
205 West Monroe Street, 2nd Floor, Chicago, IL 60606, tel. 312-263-3830, fax 312-263-3846;
and Henry A. Freedman of the Welfare Law Center.
Hunsaker v. Contra Costa County, 1998 WL 401139 (9th Cir. (Cal.), July 20, 1998).
The Ninth Circuit has reversed the lower court's granting of a permanent injunction in this class action challenge to a substance abuse screening test given to applicants for the county's General Assistance program. Plaintiffs claimed and the district court found that the test disparately affected recovering or recovered addicts who are protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by identifying a disproportionate number of false positives and burdening them with the requirement to participate in further interviews to obtain General Assistance. The lower court had found that while the screening did not deny plaintiffs "meaningful access" to benefits within the meaning of the ADA, it did violate ADA regulations prohibiting eligibility requirements that unnecessarily place burdens on those with disabilities that are not placed on others. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the finding that plaintiffs were not denied "meaningful access" and concluded that this is a necessary element of an actionable disparate impact claim. It rejected the district court's broad reading of the regulation as in effect eliminating the need to show a denial of meaningful access and said that the regulations must be read consistent with the statute. The court held that the lower court had abused its discretion in granting the injunction and reversed and remanded the case.
Plaintiffs'-Appellees' Attorney: David J. Berger, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati,
Palo Alto, California.
Davila v. Turner, Index No. 407163/96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, filed July 20, 1998).
This class action challenges the City's prac tice of assigning single parents receiving aid under New York's AFDC replacement program, to unpaid work in the Work Experience Program (WEP) in exchange for their grant, without complying with the assessment and assignment procedures required by state law. Plaintiffs are individuals who are being forced to drop out of, or barred from enrolling in, educational programs; who are having supportive services, such as child care, withheld; and who are threatened with sanctions if they continue their education programs. In April 1997 the court certified a class and granted preliminary relief. Subsequently, the state legislature amended the state's welfare law, including the provision at issue in this case, although as amended, the law remains fundamentally the same. Plaintiffs have now filed an amended complaint and moved to amend the class definition and add additional class representatives who represent claims arising under the amended state law.
Plaintiffs' attorneys: Marc Cohan, Welfare Law Center; Christopher Lamb, Legal Aid
Society, Staten Island Office, tel. (718) 273-6677, ext. 237; Susan Bahn, Legal Aid
Society, Brooklyn Office; Richard Blum, Legal Aid Society, Bronx Office; Gregory Ballard,
Scott Requadt, Yih-Hsien, Laura Lopez, Barbara Diggs, Davis, Polk & Wardwell.
Case No. SHS 98-32 (Division of Administrative Hearings on behalf of Colorado Dept. of Human Ser vices, Apr. 1, 1998) (Initial Decision and Order Grant ing Summary Judgment).
The appellant received three notices that her grant was being reduced or terminated for sanctions. Among other failures, the notices did not contain and accurate statement of appeal rights, and the first two stated that she was being sanctioned for failure to cooperate with "the work requirement, child support requirement, or immuniza tion requirement of the Colorado Works Program." Appellant sought summary judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the notices were inadequate under state welfare regulations because she was not advised of the reason for the sanction, how she could cure the sanction, the policy authorizing the sanction, and her appeal rights. The ALJ rejected the County's argument that she should consider other oral and written communication with the appellant in determining the adequacy of notice. The ALJ concluded that the notices were not adequate within the meaning of state regulations and that the sanctions were ineffective. A Final Agency Decision affirming this Initial Decision was issued on May 26, 1998.
Appellant's attorney: Melody Fuller, Boulder County Legal Services, Boulder, CO, tel. (303) 449-2946.
Case No. SHS-96-283 (Division of Administrative Services on behalf of Colorado Dept. of Human Services, June 10, 1998) (Initial Decision and Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment).
Appellant sought summary judgment in her challenge to the adequacy of two sanction notices which stated that the sanction was imposed for failure to cooperate "with the work requirement, child support requirement or immunization requirement of the Colorado Works Program." The notices had other defects as well, including failure to state how appellant could cure the sanction or establish good cause. Appellant never received written notice of the second and third sanctions. The ALJ found that the notices were inadequate as a matter of law for the same reasons expressed in the final decision in Appeal No. SHS-98-32, and he rejected arguments that adequacy could be measured by information provided through another source, such as the Individual Responsibility Contract. He also found that the notices did not comply with the requirements of a state agency letter regarding notices and that even the proposed language contained in the agency letter did not meet the regulatory requirements for adequate notice. The ALJ also concluded that because the notices were legally inadequate they could not begin the 90 day period for appeal and rejected the department's argument that the appeal was untimely. The sanctions were accordingly reversed. A Final Decision affirming this Initial Decision was reportedly subsequently issued.
Appellant's attorney: Linda Olson, Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan Denver, 1905 Sherman St., Suite 400, Denver, CO 80203-1181, tel. (303) 837-1321; fax (303) 830-7860.