Gamboa v. Rubin, Nos. 94-15302, 94-15303 (Apr. 9, 1996).
In this class action on behalf of all those who are ineligible for benefits because their equity in an automobile exceeds $1500, the Ninth Circuit in a 2-1 decision vacated HHS's $1500 auto equity limit regulation, 45 C.F.R. Sec. 233.20 (a)(3)(i)(B)(2). The HHS Secretary is a third party defendant in the case. The other Circuits (1st, 4th, 6th, 8th) that have considered the issue have upheld the regulation. The Court concluded that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the regulation since they would receive redress for the denial of AFDC: during an interim period before a new regulation is promulgated one auto will be exempt regardless of equity and a new regulation with a limit reflecting inflation will no longer be arbitrary and capricious. In finding the regulation valid when adopted in 1982, the Court concluded that the Secretary acted reasonably in relying on a 1979 study of food stamp recipients even though the report's data was incomplete. It also rejected claims that the Secretary's brief response to comments opposing the $1500 limit violated the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553. However, the Court found that the Secretary was arbitrary and capricious in not adjusting the $1500 to account for subsequent inflation. It said that periodic adjustment is the only way to accomplish Congress' goals of reducing federal costs and encouraging families' self-sufficiency. It noted that in 1982 HHS interpreted Congress' purpose to be to preserve eligibility and that because of inflation this purpose is no longer served by the $1500 limit. The absence of a statutory mandate for periodic adjustment was not dispositive. In a situation like this where economic conditions are relevant to the rationality of the regulation, periodic review is required. The Court did not find persuasive the argument that Congress considered but did not adopt a proposal to increase the limit. The Court also held that a state law challenge to the state's use of the AFDC auto limit to determine Medicaid eligibility was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and ordered the claim remanded to state court. The strongly worded dissent argued that there was no jurisdiction to hear the claim since plaintiffs' failure to petition HHS for a rule change meant there was no "agency action" to review under the Administrative Procedure Act. In addition, the statute gives such broad discretion to the Secretary to set the automobile limit that under Heckler v. Chaney there is no meaningful standard for judicial review. The dissent sharply criticized the majority for intruding in policy decisions that belong to Congress and the Secretary. It argued that Congress was well aware of the question of how inflation affects dollar amounts set by federal programs but decided to leave the establishment of the auto limit to the Secretary rather than to prescribe an inflation adjustment. It is the Secretary's duty to balance the competing policy objectives in setting a limit. The dissent argued that the majority's reasoning affects numerous regulations setting dollar limits that are affected by inflation and challenged the policy decisions reflected in the majority decision. It criticized the nationwide scope of the remedy as having serious fiscal consequences and nullifying the decisions of other circuits which have upheld the regulation. CH # 48,422.
Hunter v. Gallant, Civ. Action No. 94-30278-MAP (Mar. 7, 1996)(Settlement Agreement).
This class action challenged the state Department's policy of terminating AFDC for caretaker relatives whose only child(ren) were temporarily in foster care. The Secretary of HHS was a third party defendant. The parties have settled the case based on HHS's position that an otherwise eligible caretaker relative can qualify for AFDC for herself even though her child(ren) are temporarily in foster care, as long as the relative can show that she still continues to exercise care and control of the child under 45 C.F.R. Sec. 233.90. The temporarily absent child cannot be the basis for another household's AFDC categorical eligibility at the same time, however. HHS's position is based on its interpretation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 609. The state Department has amended its regulations, will notify potential class members, and will make up to $600,000 available for payment of retroactive benefits. CH # 51,133.
Pyfrom v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 39 Mass. App. 621 (Jan. 22, 1996).
An Appeals Court has upheld a favorable lower court decision in a case involving the termination of a mother's AFDC benefits during a period when her husband had temporary custody of their daughter. During this period, the mother had visitation two evenings a week and on Sundays, retained legal custody, and was involved in the child's medical care and religious upbringing, and had contact with the child's medical and day care providers. The court agreed that under prior caselaw the plaintiff had "substantial involvement in her child's life" that satisfied the AFDC requirement that she continue to exercise care and control over the child. The court noted that the plaintiff needed financial assistance to maintain a home for herself and her child and that the father was not an AFDC recipient. CH # 49,792.
Doe v. Chandler, Civ. Action 95-00498 (HG) (D. Hawaii Jan. 18, 1996).
In this challenge to Hawaii's imposition of a shorter time limit on general assistance to individuals disabled by substance abuse problems (6 months) than the limit on assistance to others with disabilities (one year), the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that they are likely to succeed in their claim that this distinction violates the Americans with Disabilities Act. CH # 51,132.
Stanberry v. Sherman, 75 F.3rd 581 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 1996).
For the second time in two years, the 10th Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(h) does not create a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. Sec.1983. Section 602(h) states that "each state shall evaluate the need standard and the payment standard under its plan at least once every three years. . . and report the results to the Secretary and the public . . . ." In an unpublished 1994 opinion, the 10th Circuit upheld the dismissal of a suit challenging Colorado's failure to update its standard. Johnson v. Beye, 17 F.3rd 1437. In that case, the court relied on Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, to hold that Sec. 602(h) created no enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities. In light of subsequent congressional action to limit Suter to its specific holding, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320a-2, the court now holds that its reading of Suter was not essential to its holding in Johnson. It therefore affirms the district court's holding that the plaintiffs in this case have no enforceable federal right against the state of Wyoming to force it to reevaluate its standards and file a report on the reevaluation with HHS. Although the court does not explain why the seemingly mandatory language of Sec. 602(h) does not create an enforceable right, it appears that its decision was at least in part based on the fact that the statute "only" requires reevaluation and a report and does not require that states take any action based on their reevaluations. CH # 49,984
Dorsey v. Thompkins, 1996 W.L. 88762 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 29, 1996).
The district court has dismissed a challenge to an alleged policy of the Ohio welfare agency to count student financial aid in calculating the amount of JOBS-related transportation benefits paid to welfare recipients under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(g). In an astonishing decision, the court held that welfare recipients cannot use 42 U.S.C. Sec.1983 to enforce 42 U.S.C. Sec.1087uu, which prohibits counting student financial aid in determining AFDC benefits. According to the court, Sec. 1983 enforcement is foreclosed because "the overall administrative remedial and review scheme at issue here [i.e. HHS oversight and fair hearings] is sufficiently comprehensive to support a finding that Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement of Sec. 1087uu, as applied to Sec. 602(g)(2), under Sec. 1983, or at the very least, that Congress intended for aid recipients to exhaust the remedial scheme offered by the state before pursuing any federal judicial remedies." The court did not discuss, or seem aware of, the nearly 30 years of Supreme Court precedent holding that welfare recipients can enforce provisions of the AFDC statute in federal court. Plaintiffs have a motion pending asking the court to reconsider its decision. CH # pending.
In re X (Delaware Dept. of Health and Social Services, Div. of Soc. Servs., March 26, 1996).
Appellant is an AFDC recipient who had to quit her job when her truck broke down, leaving her with no transportation to her job. The agency acted to terminate her grant for voluntarily quitting her job and subsequently refusing to comply with the job search requirements of "A Better Chance" Program (the state's AFDC waiver project which among other things requires recipients to enter and comply with a "mutually agreed upon contract" to lead to self-sufficiency). Appellant challenged the termination on the grounds that the breakdown of her transportation was good cause for her job quit and that the state's failure to provide her the support services, namely transportation, needed for job search gave her good cause for her non-participation. The hearing officer agreed with the appellant and reversed the termination. CH # pending.