CHAPTER
17: DOES THE ADA REQUIRE PROGRAMS TO MODIFY THE LIFETIME LIMIT FOR TANF |
Chapter 17: Does the ADA Require Programs to Modify the Lifetime Limit for TANF Cash Benefits for
People with Disabilities?
PRWORA imposes a 60 month lifetime limit on federal cash
assistance,[993]
but states are free to set shorter benefit limits.[994] Many
have done so, some as short as 21 months. [995]
Although many states have exceptions to time limits for some
people with disabilities, many do not,[996] and those that do may not make exceptions to
everyone with disabilities who needs them. The result is that people
with disabilities will be subject to lifetime limits on cash benefits
when they are not able to support their families and need additional
benefits. Does the ADA
require states to extend TANF benefits beyond state lifetime benefit
limits for people with disabilities?
A. Do Time Limits Have a Disparate Impact on People with
Disabilities?
Time limits for benefits create a hardship for many TANF
recipients, but may have a particularly harsh impact on people with
disabilities. People with
disabilities on the whole may be less ready to work when they exhaust
lifetime benefits, for a number of reasons related to their
disabilities, including: 1)
the failure to receive appropriate support programs and reasonable
modifications in programs during the benefit period that would have made
them ready for work, due to absence or unavailability of programs to
meet their needs; 2)
the failure to be appropriately assessed for a disability or given an
appropriate plan that would help the individual receive the services
needed to prepare for work;
3) lack of accessible transportation to jobs and job interviews;
4) the failure to make modifications in the job application
process; 5)
the disability itself is sufficiently limiting as to make work
impossible or possible only at great risk or pain, when benefits are due
to end;
6) discrimination by employers against people with disabilities;
and
7) lack sufficient time to become work-ready. B. Discrimination in Providing Services at an Earlier Point in
Time
One possible ADA argument is that people with disabilities are
affected by time limits to a greater extent than others because they
need education and training programs, support services, and reasonable
modifications to become ready for work. Thus, one result of the failure to provide these services
when people are receiving benefits is that people with disabilities are,
on the whole, less ready to work when benefits are exhausted.
This argument has numerous drawbacks.
The first is the difficulty in proving that the failure to
receive these services at an earlier point in time is the reason for
lack of readiness to work. Another
is that many people without disabilities need these services as well and
thus disparate impact may be difficult to prove.
A third is that there is little evidence that either Congress or
states intended to make ending cash assistance contingent on an
individual’s ability to work. And,
where states explicitly treat TANF benefits and work requirements as
separate programs, it will be even more difficult to link the two.[997]
States may also argue that extending benefits is not the only way
to remedy this type of disparate impact, and they can satisfy their
obligations under the ADA by providing people with disabilities with
additional education, training, and support services after benefit
limits have been reached. However,
a strong argument can be made that this is not an adequate remedy
because one purpose of providing assessments, programs, modifications,
and supports is to assist people in becoming ready for work before their
benefits run out. C.
Is There an Argument that People with Disabilities Need More Time to
Become Self-Sufficient?
The argument that lifetime limits on benefits discriminate
against people with disabilities because they generally need more
education, training, and support before they can become economically
independent, and therefore need to receive cash benefits for a longer
period of time while they are preparing for work, is also problematic.
The ADA claim would be that additional cash benefits are needed
to “[p]rovide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid,
benefit or service that is not as effective in affording an equal
opportunity to obtain the same result . . . or to reach the same level
of achievement as that provided to others.”[998] There
is certainly evidence that people with disabilities are more likely to
stay on benefits for longer, and have a greater difficulty finding work.
This is particularly true for individuals with drug and alcohol
problems, psychiatric disabilities, cognitive disabilities, and learning
disabilities.[999]
Disparate impact, however, may be difficult to demonstrate,
because disability is not the only barrier associated with needing
public benefits for longer periods of time.[1000]
Moreover, it may be difficult to prove that people with
disabilities have been denied “meaningful access” to TANF benefits
under the Choate standard.[1001]
If people with disabilities have been given the same number of
months of benefits as others (or in some cases more, if some months of benefits were
excluded from the calculation), the discrimination claim would be based
on the fact that people with disabilities need more time.
This is a very difficult disparate impact claim.
The lifetime benefit limits do not meet the disparate impact test
in Choate, because time limits
“leave both handicapped and nonhandicapped Medicaid users with
identical and effective services fully available for their use, with
both classes of users subject to the same limitation;”[1002] there is no evidence that people with
disabilities “will be unable to benefit meaningfully” from the
benefit they do receive; [1003] the time limit does not have a “particular
exclusionary effect” on people with disabilities;[1004]
and the time limit does not “distinguish between those whose coverage
will be reduced and those whose coverage will not on the basis of any
test, judgment or trait that [people with disabilities] as a class are
any less capable of meeting or less likely of having.”[1005]
It is difficult to argue that people with disabilities have been
denied meaningful access to cash benefits when they have received
between 21 and 60 months of benefits (or more if the time clock has been
tolled). If the purpose of
the benefits is to provide income support to families in need, that
purpose was fulfilled during the months in which benefits were received,
and it was fulfilled to the same degree that it was fulfilled for
families without members with disabilities.
This type of claim may be somewhat stronger if TANF programs
described the purpose of benefits in a particular way, but given the Choate
meaningful access standard, and the difficulty of demonstrating a
“particular exclusionary effect” on people with disabilities, it
would still be extremely difficult. In Choate,
people with disabilities who used hospital services during a recent year
were more than three times as likely to need more than the maximum
amount of hospital coverage provided by the state Medicaid program as
those without disabilities using hospitals that year,[1006]
and people with disabilities were more than four times as likely as
Medicaid recipients without disabilities to need five days more than the
maximum covered amount,[1007]
but the Court was still not satisfied that the limit distinguished on
the basis of a test or trait “that people with disabilities are less
capable of meeting or less likely of having.”
Arguing that “readiness to work at the time limit” is the
trait people with disabilities are less likely to meet is not a viable
means of getting around the problem discussed above, because state time
limits are framed in terms of months, not readiness to work.
In addition to the fact that there may be little if any evidence
to support such an argument, “readiness to work” would not
necessarily require TANF programs to offer any particular duration of
benefits. In Choate, the Supreme Court identified the general purpose of Medicaid
as “assuring that individuals will receive necessary medical care,”[1008]
but did not hold that this required states to provide any particular
duration of hospital coverage in their Medicaid programs. At a minimum,
an argument of this kind would have to be based on statements of purpose
in state statutes, plans, and other TANF program materials linking the
benefit cap to the assumption that people will be ready to work when
benefits are exhausted.
One difference between the facts of Choate
and TANF time limits is that in Choate
the coverage limit only had a disparate impact on a small percentage of
Medicaid recipients with disabilities and an even smaller percentage of
the overall state Medicaid population.
The data showed that the coverage limit would fully meet the
hospital needs served of 95 percent of state Medicaid recipients with
disabilities.[1009]
In contrast, a much larger percentage of TANF recipients with
disabilities would not have their full need for income support met under
lifetime benefit limits. But
Choate’s
holding did not rely heavily on these statistics.
In fact, the Court seemed more concerned with the prospect of
interpreting Section 504 in a manner that would in effect require an
entity subject to Section 504 to assess the effect of every contemplated
action on people with disabilities and adopt the least harmful
alternative.[1010]
Given the fact that benefits time limits are neutral and the same
limit applies to everyone; the fact that they do not restrict initial
access to benefits but affect the amount of services provided; the fact
that neutral benefit limits will always be insufficient some people; the
fact that many people without disabilities will also need benefits
beyond the time limit; and the fact that PRWORA gives states maximum
flexibility in program design; a challenge to neutral benefit time
limits under the ADA would be extremely difficult.
D.
Fundamental Alteration and Undue Burden
If it were possible
to make a successful discrimination argument challenging a lifetime
limit for cash benefits, it would be possible to overcome a state’s
fundamental alteration or undue burden arguments.
When a state has adopted a lifetime benefit limit that is less
than 60 months, it would not be inconsistent with PRWORA for states to
extend that time limit and provide TANF cash benefits for up to 60
months. Even where a state
has adopted a 60-month lifetime limit, it would not be a fundamental
alteration of or inconsistent with PRWORA to extend benefits beyond that
limit, because benefits that are provided after the time limit has been
reached could be paid for with state maintenance of effort funds.[1011] In
addition, PRWORA specifically allows states to exempt up to 20 percent
of the average monthly number of families receiving assistance from the
60 month requirement for “hardship,”[1012]
or if the family has an member who has been battered or subject to
extreme cruelty.[1013]
Nothing prevents a state from defining “hardship” to include people
with disabilities. If a
state chooses not to include people with disabilities in this exemption,
it can hardly rely on this choice to argue that it would be a
fundamental alteration to do it for people with disabilities.
Extending benefits does not change the eligibility requirements
for or the substance of TANF benefits (though it does change the overall
amount of benefits provided). As
many states already provide extensions of time limits for a variety of
reasons, they already have a process in place to make individualized
determinations of eligibility for extensions and thus cannot reasonably
argue that granting extensions would be an undue burden because of the
cost of creating such a mechanism.
Other PRWORA provisions undercut arguments that it would be
burdensome to the state to extend benefits beyond a state’s lifetime
benefit limit. PRWORA has a
“reasonable cause” exception to penalties for non-compliance with
the 60-month requirement, [1014]
and an exception to penalties when a state corrects or discontinues the
violation under an approved corrective action plan.[1015] Thus
states have a number of opportunities to avoid any penalties they risk
incurring by extending federal cash benefits beyond 60 months.
It would not be advisable to argue that extending the time limits
to people with disabilities who are unable to work would not be a
fundamental alteration because the purpose of time limits make no sense
when applied to these individuals.[1016] The
purpose of benefit limits is not just to motivate people to work, but to
make people less dependent on benefits.
Ending benefits will achieve that purpose for everyone, whether
they or not they are able to work at that time.
Generally, concrete, limited extensions of time are more likely
to be regarded as reasonable than open-ended ones under the ADA.[1017]
Therefore, any requests for extensions of benefits should be for
finite amounts of time when possible.
Advocates can also argue that months in which an individual did
not receive appropriate education and training programs or other
services and supports needed because of disability should not be counted
towards the time limit.[1018]
E. Can States Deny Extensions of Time Limits to Individuals with
Disabilities Who Have Been Sanctioned?
A number of states require TANF recipients who want to continue
to receive benefits beyond a lifetime benefit limit to show “good
faith” compliance with work requirements or other TANF program
requirements. Others deny
extensions to individuals who have been sanctioned for non-compliance
with work requirements.[1019]
States will probably take the position that people with
disabilities who cannot meet work requirements or those who have been
sanctioned are not “qualified individuals” with disabilities under
the ADA because they do not meet an essential eligibility requirement
for receiving additional benefits. However, when individuals with
disabilities are unable to meet these requirements for reasons related
to their disabilities, these requirements are “eligibility criteria”
for the extension of benefits that
“screen out or tend to screen out” people with disabilities
from the full and equal enjoyment of benefits[1020]
and methods of administration that have a discriminatory effect.[1021]
People with disabilities may be unable to satisfy these
requirements for all of the reasons previously listed in the Manual.
They include: the failure of programs to adequately screen and
assess disabilities;[1022] the failure to provide appropriate work
placements and education and training programs; failure to provide
reasonable modifications at these placements and programs;[1023]
and so on. Programs may also have sanction procedures that make it more
likely that people with disabilities will be sanctioned, including
notices and procedures that are difficult for people with disabilities
to understand or follow.[1024]
Programs may also define work narrowly, making it more difficult
for people with disabilities to fulfill work requirements.[1025]
In all of these situations, the TANF program is using the result
of one type of discrimination to discriminate in another manner, by
using these results as criteria for eligibility for continued benefits.
Preliminary data indicating that people with disabilities are
being sanctioned at higher rates than those without disabilities[1026]
suggests that requiring families to have sanction-free records will have
a disparate impact on people with disabilities.
In addition, even if states do not investigate the reasons for
program requirements under other circumstances, a strong argument can be
made that to avoid discriminating on the basis of disability, they must
do so if they require a sanction-free record as a condition of obtaining
an extension of benefits.
States will no doubt argue that showing good faith compliance and
having a record free of sanctions are “essential eligibility
requirements” for receiving additional benefits and that they have no
obligation to modify these essential program requirements for people
with disabilities. There
are two possible approaches advocates can take in response. One is to
argue that cash benefits up to the lifetime limit and extensions of
those benefits are one program,[1027]
and people who have already received cash benefits (who continue to meet
other eligibility requirements) are therefore obviously qualified for
that program. To support
this argument, advocates can argue that the substance of the benefits
and of continued benefits past the state time limit are the same, and
every eligibility requirement, with the exception of showing good faith
compliance or having a record free of sanctions, is the same.
In addition, state statutes and regulations are unlikely to
describe the cash benefits program and extension of those benefits past
a lifetime limit as separate programs.
One problem with this argument is that it may appear inconsistent
with arguing that the requirements for receiving continued benefits are
“eligibility criteria” that screen people with disabilities out of
the program or service of continued benefits, which suggests that
continued benefits are a separate program, at least for some purposes.
There may be some instances in which a state’s program for individuals
who have exhausted benefits under a time limit does qualify as a
separate program. Advocates
can also argue that cash benefits up to the lifetime limit are one
program, and benefits beyond that point another, and the continued
benefits program uses the effects of discrimination in one program as
eligibility criteria for another, and the effect of failing to provide
appropriate screening and assessment, support programs, and reasonable
modifications at work placements cannot be essential eligibility
requirements.
States may also try to argue that their benefits extension
policies do not discriminate because benefit extensions are not required
by the TANF program but are something “extra.”[1028]
This is irrelevant. State and local governments and agencies are
not permitted to administer any program, service or benefit in a manner
that has a discriminatory effect. Back to the top [995]. See Third Annual TANF Report, supra note 22, at § XIII, 219-21; See also October 1998 Urban Institute Report, supra note 431, at app. D. One state has an 18-month limit, but individuals become re-eligible for benefits after 3 months. [1014]. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 609(b)(1) (West 2000). This argument has the same problem as in the one identified above: TANF regulations define “reasonable cause” in a manner that does not include exempting people who can’t get work for disability-related reasons. See 45 C.F.R. § 262.5 (1999). In fact, the regulations have 2 additional ways of demonstrating reasonable cause for failing to satisfy the 60 month limit. See 45 C.F.R. § 262.5(b)(2) (1999), and neither are disability-related. [1017]. In the employment context, courts have held that time-limited leave can be considered a reasonable accommodation under Title I of the ADA, but open-ended indefinite leave is far less likely to be reasonable. See, e.g., Morton v. GTE North Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1996), aff’d mem., 114 F.3d 1182 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 880 (1997); Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1996); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995). This case law is arguably of limited relevance to TANF time limits, because open-ended extensions of benefits may be far more reasonable than open-ended leave. Employers need to know about employees’ expected return to the job so they can make staffing decisions; TANF programs obviously do not have the same concern when extending benefits. |